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With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large eort to study seller revenue
maximization, following Myerson’s seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of
view of the buyer in classical auctions and ask the question of whether she has an incentive to shade her bid
even in auctions that are reputed to be truthful, when aware of the revenue optimization mechanism.
We show that in auctions such as the Myerson auction or a VCG with reserve price set as the monopoly
price, the buyer who is aware of this information has indeed an incentive to shade. Intuitively, by selecting the
revenue maximizing auction, the seller introduces a dependency on the buyers’ distributions in the choice of
the auction. We study in depth the case of the Myerson auction and show that a symmetric equilibrium exists
in which buyers shade non-linearly what would be their rst price bid. ey then end up with an expected
payo that is equal to what they would get in a rst price auction with no reserve price.
We conclude that a return to simple rst price auctions with no reserve price or at least non-dynamic
anonymous ones is desirable from the point of view of both buyers, sellers and increasing transparency.
1 INTRODUCTION
Billions of auctions are run worldwide everyday. One of the main supplier of such auctions is
the online advertising market [Allouah and Besbes, 2017, Amin et al., 2012, Balseiro et al., 2015].
Ad slots are sold to advertisers by a publisher, typically a web site, following more or less explicit
mechanisms, i.e., a type of auctions with specic rules. ose auctions take place on platforms
known as “ad exchanges” [Muthukrishnan, 2009].
Maybe the most common types of auctions used in this seing are the classical second price
auctions with or without reserve prices as they are reputed to be truthful (it is dominant to bid the
true valuation) and even optimal for identical bidders [Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981].
Auction theory has been developed for several decades (and several Nobel prices were granted for
those breakthroughs). As a consequence, optimal strategies of the bidders (when they exist) and
revenue maximizing mechanisms are almost perfectly understood.
However, one of the crucial working assumption is that the seller must know the distribution of
valuations of the bidders to tune optimally her mechanism (for instance by seing the right reserve
price). In practice though, this assumption is obviously not satised [Wilson, 1987]. On the other
hand, in most real life applications, such as online advertising, auctions between a single publisher
and the same advertisers are not run only once, but several hundred thousand times each day. As
a consequence, the seller has access to an incredibly large amount of bids from each bidder for
more or less equivalent goods. So one trend of research is to learn the optimal mechanisms from
the past sequence of bids, assuming that they truthfully represent the valuations of the bidders
[Amin et al., 2015, 2014, Blum et al., 2015, Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2013, Chawla et al., 2007, Cole and
Roughgarden, 2014, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis, 2016, Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015, Fu et al., 2013,
Kanoria and Nazerzadeh, 2014, Medina and Mohri, 2014, Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016,
Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011].
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e motivation behind this traditional assumption is that the seller is only choosing incentive
compatible auctions such as Vickrey auctions. erefore, since in a one shot second price auctions
it is optimal to bid one’s own valuations, the seller can safely expect to observe the past valuations
of the buyer, and hence an approximation of her distribution of valuations. Even if computing the
optimal auction of Myerson might be complicated, as it needs an almost number of samples, there
exist approximatively optimal auctions [Fu et al., 2013, Hartline, 2009, Hartline and Roughgarden,
2009] requiring a much more reasonable amount of data.
Our starting point is the following claim. If the seller uses data acquired on past auctions to
update the mechanism (say, to x dynamically the reserve price) then the repeated mechanism
might no longer be truthful. Intuitively, this is rather clear. Assume that the reserve price in the
second price auction of a seller is determined by her past bids. By bidding untruthfully (even
in Vickrey auctions!), the bidder might lower drastically her reserve price, at a small cost of lost
auctions. As a result, her bids might actually clear the new reserve price more oen than with
truthful bids.
We actually prove this intuition that several mechanisms known to be truthful in the one shot
case are no longer truthful in the repeated seing. Assuming symmetrical bidders and a seller
that myopically designs a Myerson auction with respect to the past sequence of bids (in eect
assuming they were equal to the valuations), we prove that a symmetric equilibrium enforce the
same outcome than second price auctions without reserve prices !
Actually, our results do not rely on the nite sample seing that has received a lot of aention
recently (both from the seller, but also on the bidder point of view [McAfee, 2011, Weed et al.,
2016]). We will directly assume that a strategy of a bidder is a modication (or a function) of her
true valuation, that the seller observes the distribution of bids, from which she computes reserve
prices. e payo of a strategy (a.k.a a modifying or shading function) will therefore be computed
as the expected gain of the auctions run with all those parameters. Although interesting, puing
an extra layer of learning over datasets of nite sample size is not necessarily to convey our main
messages.
e paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we prove
the claim that repeated “one-shot truthful” auctions (for several widely used types of auction) are
no longer truthful by exhibiting a simple strategy that dominates truthful bidding. We investigate
in detail the Myerson auction in Section 4, where we prove that a symmetric equilibrium enforces
the same outcome as second price auctions without reserve prices. e Appendix contains more
technical results, reminders and proofs of some lemmas.
2 SETTING
We consider K independent bidders with distributions of valuation F ∈ F participating to
repeated independent auctions: the values Xi of bidder i in the dierent auctions are i.i.d., drawn
from Fi . We consider only stationary strategies, i.e., the bidder i applies a function βi : R 7→ R
mapping her value to a bid, and we denote by B ⊆ {R 7→ R}K the set of strategy proles. We
will assume the βi to be increasing – i.e. the higher the value, the higher the bid. We denote
H = (H1 . . .HK ) ∈ H(F ,B) the resulting distributions of bids – i.e. Hi is the distribution of
Bi = βi (Xi ) where Xi is drawn from Fi . Especially, as the βi are increasing, we can have
Hi (b) = Fi (β−1i (b)) and hi (b) =
fi (β−1i (b))
β ′i (β−1i (b))
Another quantity of interest in auction studies, only depending on the distribution of a r.v. X
with distribution F , is the virtual value of a bidderψX (x) = x − 1−F (x )f (x ) and the related hazard rate
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λX (x) = f (x )1−F (x ) . We can notice we have the following link between the virtual values of X and B:
ψB (β(x)) − β(x) = β ′(x)(ψX (x) − x) and λB (β(x)) = λX (x)
β ′(x) (1)
Hence, up to solving the ODE (1), we can manipulate equivalently the bidder’s strategy β , the
virtual valueψB ◦ β at value x exposed to the seller or the corresponding hazard rate λB ◦ β .
2.1 Revenue Maximizing Auctions
With the widespread use of auctions in online advertising markets, there has been an extensive
work about characterizing and estimating revenue-maximizing auctions in dierent seings. More
recently, some focus has been put on practical estimation of such auctions and derivation of
approximations simpler to optimize, such as boosted second-price auctions [Golrezaei et al., 2017]
or second-price with monopoly reserve price [Roughgarden and Wang, 2016].
More formally, ∆ being the space of probability distributions over the K bidders, the seller chooses
a class of auctionsA = {(RK+ ,Q,M)} consisting in a pair of functions Q : RK+ → ∆ (allocation rule)
andM : RK+ → RK+ (payment rule). Here, Qi (b) is the probability for bidder i to win when bidders
submit b andMi (b) the corresponding expected payment. We denote
qi (bi ) = EH−i (Qi (bi ,B−i )) andmi (bi ) = EH−i (Mi (bi ,B−i ))
As she only observes bid distributions H ∈ H(F ,B), the seller picks the revenue maximizing
auction,
a∗H = ((RK+ ,Q∗H ,M∗H )) = argmaxa∈A
K∑
i=1
EHi
(
m(a)i (B)
)
Under incentive compatibility and individual rationality, the expected payment of bidder i is
EHi (mi (Bi )) =mi (0) + EH
(
ψBi (Bi )Qi (B)
)
,
see, e.g., [Myerson, 1981]. e seller does not observe F but only H , and we will always assume
that she is not strategic: she optimizes her revenue as if she was observing the valuations, i.e.,
a∗H = argmaxa∈A EH
K∑
i=1
Q (a)i (B)ψBi (Bi )
2.2 Examples of mechanisms, allocations and payment rules.
We introduce in this section some of the widely-used (and truthful) auctions mechanisms that
we will consider.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are second price auctions with non-anonymous
reserve prices, i.e., dierent reserve prices to dierent bidder. en A is the set of all possible
reserve prices. Dierent allocation rule exist: an item can be allocated to the highest bidder amongst
all those that have cleared their reserve price, or to no one if no reserve price is cleared. We will
call it the eager version of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.
Another allocation rule dictates to allocate the item to the higher bidder, if she has cleared her
reserve price, and to no one otherwise. is version of the VCG mechanism will be called lazy
(with anonymous reserve prices, eager and lazy versions coincide).
Computations of optimal non-anonymous reserve prices suer from being NP-hard [Paes Leme
et al., 2016] and even APX-hard[Roughgarden andWang, 2016]. However, [Roughgarden andWang,
2016] also proved that using the monopoly priceψ−1i (0) as reserve price in a VCG auction leads to
a 2-approximation of the Myerson auction. It also led [Paes Leme et al., 2016] to prove that the lazy
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version of VCG admit the monopoly price as optimal reserve price and is a 2-approximation of the
VCG with optimal reserve prices.
Myerson type of auctions allocate the item to the highest non-negative (assuming there is one)
virtual value of the bidsψBi (bi ) and to no one otherwise. e payment of the winner is the smallest
winning bid, i.e., ψ−1Bi
(
max(0, {ψBi (bj )})
)
. e Myerson auction maximizes the expected seller
revenue at the equilibrium, at least if virtual values are increasing. Moreover, in the symmetric case
where the distribution of valuations Fi is the same for all bidder, then Myerson auction coincides
with the VCG auction with reserve priceψ−1Bi (0).
A Myerson-type of auctions would follow the same rules except that any non-linear, increasing
transformation ψ˜ can be used instead of the actual virtual value. In that case, A can be either the
set of such transformations, or the set of transformations and non-anonymous reserve prices.
Boosted second price auctions. In boosted second price auctions [Golrezaei et al., 2017],
the seller chooses parameters {(sj , r j )}nj=1 and boosts the bid bi of bidder i by si while keeping a
reserve price ri . As a consequence, a bid is transformed into a virtual one through the formula
wi = si (bi − ri ). en A is the set of ane transformations of the bids, or subsets thereof.
Boosted second price auctions actually correspond to Myerson-type auctions if the distributions
of valuations belong to the family of Generalized Pareto (GP) distributions. We refer to Section B in
the Appendix for more details on the class of GP distributions. Approximating the actual distribution
of valuations by a GP, and computing the optimal mechanism w.r.t. theses approximations can
actually be simpler than the optimal Myerson auction [Golrezaei et al., 2017].
Other mechanisms: posted price, rst price, etc. ere exist many other auction mecha-
nisms that are more or less equivalent to one of the former under specic assumptions. For instance,
in posted price auctions, the seller xes a price and the item is sold to one bidder (or all of them)
whose valuation is higher than the price. Notice that posting price is equivalent to VCG if only one
buyer participates in the auctions.
Computing and learning the optimal posted price can also be done in an online fashion and/or
using nite number of samples [Blum et al., 2003, Bubeck et al., 2017, Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]
In rst price auctions, the item is sold to the highest bidder (or potentially the bidder with the
highest virtual bids, or the highest bidder above his reserve price) but with the simple payment
rule: the highest bidder simply pays his winning (virtual) bids. Revenue equivalence principle
[Krishna, 2009] states that these auctions are, at the equilibrium, more or less equivalent, but the
reputed truthfulness (hence simple “optimal strategies”) of second-price auction make these type
of auctions less common, for the moment at least [Sluis, 2017].
2.3 Strategic Buyer Problem under Seller Revenue Maximization
In the literature, the study of revenue maximization is done under the assumption that buyers bid
truthfully even if they are aware of the revenue maximization mechanism. is can be motivated
in certain seings where the seller faces repeated auctions, but buyers change from auction to
auction (as on EBay). When the buyers are interacting repeatedly with the same seller and if they
know the mechanism, such as dynamic reserve prices, it is quite easy to exhibit examples proving
that incentive compatibility is lost. Yet, state-of-art comes short of providing the bidders with a
beer strategy than being truthful. is lack of understanding of the buyers strategy in presence of
dynamic reserve prices is arguably one of the major factor for the shi of the market towards rst
price auctions [Sluis, 2017].
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We are only considering stationary strategies and assuming that auctions are innitely repeated
and undiscounted, hence the pay-o of bidder i , whose valuation isXi ∼ F and bidsBi = βi (Xi ) ∼ Hi ,
is dened by
Πi (βi ) = E
(
(Xi −ψBi (Bi ))Q (a
∗
H )
i (B)
)
, (2)
where B ∼ H is the vector of bids send by the bidders.
en, supposing the seller is choosing the revenue maximization auctions within a given class
of truthful auctions (e.g. seing dierent prices, various boosted second price auctions etc…), the
question is whether it’s still in the interest of the bidders to remain truthful. In light of the seller’s
optimizing behavior (and because we consider innitely undiscounted repeated auctions), player
i faces the following optimization problem. Given the distribution of valuations X ∼ F and the
bidding strategies of other bidders Bj = βj (X j ) ∼ Hj , solve
max
βi
Πi (βi ) , subject to a∗H = argmaxa∈A EH
(
K∑
i=1
Q (a)i (B)ψBi (Bi )
)
. (3)
Depending on the auction class A, the bidders may not be able to derive optimal strategies
from (3) and it is not clear whether they always have incentive to bid untruthfully. Hence, we
propose in Section 3 to study if several auctions considered in revenue optimization are robust to a
simple shading scheme in the context of a bidder optimizing (3). en, in Section 4, we compute
the equilibrium strategy of (3) for Myerson auctions with symmetric bidders.
3 LOSS OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY.
To get a sense of whether revenue optimization completely breaks the truthfulness, we rst
study whether several common auctions used for revenue optimization are robust to a very simple
modication of strategy: a linear shading of the truthful bid Bi = αiXi – i.e. B = {x 7→ αx : α ∈
[0, 1]K }. en, the relationship between virtual values and hazard rate simplies,
ψB (αx) = αψX (x) and λB (αx) = 1
α
λX (x)
We are going to consider the simple seing where only bidder i is being strategic. e assumption
of the other bidders being truthful is not a strong restriction as we do not consider the bidders to
be symmetric, hence a bidder j bidding truthfully under a distribution of value Fj can also be seen
as a bidder following a strategy βj under a distribution of value Fj ◦ βj .
A mild technical point related to the issue of support might need to be raised: to the le of the
support of X we can dene the hazard rate as 0 and henceψ is equal to −∞ there. In particular, if B
and X don’t have the same support.
3.1 Myerson Auction
For simplicity we writeψXi (x) = ψi (x). In this case we know exactly the strategy of the seller, so
we can directly re-write the payment of i .
Q
(a∗H )
i (B) = 1[αψi (Xi )≥maxj,i (0,ψj (X j ))]
e expected payo under linear shading assuming that the other bidders xed their strategy is
Πi (α) = E
(
(Xi − αψi (Xi ))1[αψi (Xi )≥maxj,i (0,ψj (X j ))]
)
.
e following lemma states that bidder i has incentives to deviate from truthful bidding – i.e. to
choose α , 1. To support this claim, we just need to prove that ∂Πi (α )∂α , 0 at α = 1.
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Lemma 3.1. Suppose thatψi is dierentiable and thatψi (x) ≤ ψ ′i (x)x on [ψ−1i (0),∞). en
∂Πi (α)
∂α

α=1
< 0 at α = 1 .
In other words, bidder i has an incentive to shade his/her bid in this case.
e conditions of Lemma 3.1 are satised when ψ is linear, which happens when Xi has a
generalized Pareto distribution. e conditionψ (x) ≤ ψ ′(x)x is also satised forψ convex which is
not of great interest in the current context.
Proof. Recall that
Πi (α) = E
(
(Xi − αψi (Xi ))1[αψi (Xi )≥maxj,i (0,ψj (X j ))]
)
.
Let us call Yi = maxj,i ψ−1i (ψj (X j )) and G(t) = P(t ≥ Yi ); let д be its density. en
Πi (α) = E
(
(Xi − αψi (Xi ))G(ψ−1i (αψi (Xi )))1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
.
Taking the derivative of this quantity with respect to α and spliing the expectation in two, we get
∂Πi (α)
∂α

α=1
= E
(
ψi (Xi )Xi −ψi (Xi )
ψ ′i (Xi )
д(Xi )1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
, I
−E
(
ψi (Xi )G(Xi )1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
, I I
en, we recognize the expected payment (see [Myerson, 1981]) to get I I = E (mi (Xi )) , and then
by denition of the expected payment,
I I = E
(
max(ψ−1i (0),Yi )1[Xi ≥Yi ]1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
.
We now focus on the rst term. We note that д(Xi ) is the density of Yi evaluated at Xi . So
rewriting the expectation as an integral and using x −ψi (x) = (1 − Fi (x))/fi (x), we get, aer using
Fubini,
I =
∫
ψi (x)
ψ ′i (x)
д(x)(1 − F (x))1[x ≥ψ −1i (0)]dx =
∫
ψi (x)
ψ ′i (x)
д(x)1[x ≥ψ −1i (0)]
∫ ∞
x
f (t)dt ,
=
∫ ∫
ψi (x)
ψ ′i (x)
1[x ≥ψ −1i (0)]1[t ≥x ] f (t)д(x)dtdx ,
= E
(
1[Yi ≥ψ −1i (0)]1[Xi ≥Yi ]
ψi (Yi )
ψ ′i (Yi )
)
.
We can now compare I and I I , term by term. We rst note that
1[Xi ≥Yi ]1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)] ≥ 1[Yi ≥ψ −1i (0)]1[Xi ≥Yi ] .
is inequality is strict on a set of measure non-zero in our setup, so strict inequality passes to
expectations. Under the assumption we made onψ we have by denition
1[Yi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
ψi (Yi )
ψ ′i (Yi )
≤ max(ψ−1i (0),Yi ) .
en we obtain that I ≤ I I and in fact I < I I when we have strict inequalities in the above two
displays on a common set on non-zero measure. 
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Fig. 1. Myerson auction : Expected payo and its derivative for one bidder with linear shading
There are K bidders with values Unif[0, 1], only one of them is strategic. On the le hand side, we present a
plot of the expected payo Πi (αi ) of the strategic bidder for several values of K . On the right hand side, we
present the derivative ∂Πi (α )∂α

α=1
taken at the truthful bid (α = 1).
ough we do not need symmetry of the bidders’ value distribution, we start by a few examples
assuming it for concreteness. We recall that if F is the cdf of Xi , G(x) = Fn−1(x) in the case where
we have n symmetric bidders.
Example of uniform [0,1] distributions: In this case,ψi (x) = 2x−1 on [0,1] andψ−1i (0) = 1/2.
Also, G(x) = xn−1. en, using for the instance the representation of the derivative of Πi (α)
appearing in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we have
∂Πi (α)
∂α

α=1
=
∫ 1
1/2
(
x − 12
)
[(n − 1) − x(n + 1))]xn−2dx = − 1
n2n+1 (2
n − 1) < 0 .
Hence, each user has an incentive to shade their bid. We note that the derivative goes to 0 as
n →∞ (see also Fig.1 right side), which can be interpreted as saying that as the number of users
grows, each user has less and less incentive to shade. We can also observe on Fig.1 (le side)
that the dierence between the payo at optimal shading α∗ and the payo without shading –
(Π(α∗)−Π(0)) – decreases with K . Indeed, when K grows, the natural level of competition between
the bidders makes the revenue optimization mechanisms (e.g. dynamic reserve price) less useful.
Logically, being strategic against it in such case does not help much. For very few bidders, the
contrary happens. For K = 2, we even observe that the optimal strategy is to bid with a shad-
ing of α = 0+ to force a price close to 0 while still winning with probability 1/4 – when one is
beating his reserve and the opponent is not beating his, with the result of almost doubling the payo.
In conclusion, we observed that Myerson auction is not immune to deviations for a large number
of distributions (generalized Pareto). Even a linear shading can increase substantially the payo of
the bidder at the expense of the seller’s revenue. As a corollary, the boosted second price auction
incurs the same issue as they are equivalent to Myerson auction for generalized Pareto distributions.
Now, we aim at extending these results to other simple of auctions proposed in the context of seller
revenue optimization.
3.2 VCG with Revenue Optimization
In this section, we study the robustness of eager and lazy VCG auction with monopoly price to
linear shading of one bidder. All the computation are very similar for both, diering only by some
Marc Abeille, Clement Calauzenes, Noureddine El Karoui, omas Nedelec, and Vianney Perchet 8
initial denitions. We denote aMH the VCG auction with monopoly reserve priceψ
−1
B (0). en, the
expected payo of bidder i is
ΠMi (H ) = E
(
(Xi −ψBi (Bi ))Q (a
M
H )
i (B)
)
Now, considering that all bidders but i are bidding truthfully and bidder i submit bids Bi = αXi , –
i.e. Hi (b) = Fi ( bα ) – we obtain the following lemma,
Lemma 3.2. For the VCG auction (either eager or lazy) with monopoly reserve price,
∂ΠMi (α)
∂α

α=1
< 0 at α = 1 .
In other words, bidder i has an incentive to shade his/her bid even individually.
Proof. e same proof holds for both eager and lazy, just by using dierent denition for Yi . We
dene Yi = maxj,i
{
X j1[ψj (X j )≥0]
}
for the eager one and Yi = maxj,i X j for the lazy one. Dene
G(t) = P(t ≥ Yi ) and д its density. Assume that bidder i shades his bids linearly, and rewrite
ΠMi (α) = E
(
(Xi − αψi (Xi ))G(αXi )1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
.
Let us compute the partial derivatives of the payo at α = 1.
∂ΠMi (α)
∂α

α=1
= E
(
Xi (Xi −ψi (Xi ))д(Xi )1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
, I
−E
(
ψi (Xi )G(Xi )1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)]
)
︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
, I I
As before, we denote that I I = E (mi (Xi )) = E
(
max(ψ−1i (0),Yi )[Xi ≥ Yi ][Xi ≥ ψ−1i (0)]
)
. en,
similarly as before, we use Fubini argument to obtain
I =
∫
xiд(xi )(1 − Fi (xi ))[ψi (xi ) ≥ 0]dxi =
∫ ∫ ∞
xi
xiд(xi )fi (z)[ψi (xi ) ≥ 0]dzdxi
= E
(
Yi [Xi ≥ Yi ][Yi ≥ ψ−1i (0)]
)
We can now compare I and I I , term by term. We rst note that
1[Xi ≥Yi ]1[Xi ≥ψ −1i (0)] ≥ 1[Yi ≥ψ −1i (0)]1[Xi ≥Yi ] .
is inequality is strict on a set of measure non-zero, so I < I I . 
We can observe on Figure 2 a very similar results for the lazy VCG as on Figure 1 in the Myerson
case. ere is an incentive to shade the bids, decreasing with the number of bidders. However, the
optimal shading is less aggressive than in Myerson case, resulting in a smaller increment of the
bidder’s payo. Our intuition is that the class of auctions A over which the seller maximizes his
revenue is smaller than in Myerson’s case, providing less leverage to the bidders to be strategic.
Investigating the link between the complexity of A (e.g. pseudo-dimension) and the gain for the
bidders in being strategic is denitely of interest for future research.
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Fig. 2. VCG lazy : Expected payo and its derivative for one bidder with linear shading There are K
bidders with values Unif[0, 1], only one of them is strategic. On the le hand side, we present a plot of the
expected payo Πi (αi ) of the strategic bidder for several values of K . On the right hand side, we present the
derivative ∂Πi (α )∂α

α=1
taken at the truthful bid (α = 1).
4 FURTHER RESULTS FOR THE MYERSON AUCTION
4.1 Formulation of the problem
4.1.1 Dierential equation formulation. We go back to Myerson auction where bidder 1 shades
her bid by bidding B = β(X1), for a function β to be determined later, instead of her value X1.
Let ψB be the virtual value function associated with the distribution of B (in this section we
identify a random variable with its distribution, by a slight abuse of notation). We call FZ the
cumulative distribution function of Z = max2≤i≤K (0,ψi (Yi )), where Yi is the bid of bidder i , and
ψi is the virtual value function associated with the distribution of this bid. We assume as before
that bidder 1 faces K − 1 other bidders for a total of K bidders involved in the auction. We call
Vi = ψi (Yi ) and FVi the associated cumulative distribution function. We assume as before that all
bidders are independent. In this case, it is clear that FZ (x) = ∏Ki=2 FVi (x)1[x ≥0]. Of course, this cdf
has a jump discontinuity at 0 when
∏K
i=2 FVi (0) > 0.
Recall that in the Myerson auction, the expected payment of bidder 1 when she bids using B is
E
(
ψB (B)1[ψB (B)≥Z ]
)
.
See [Krishna, 2009], p. 67 and [Roughgarden, 2016] for details. In the Myerson auction, the expected
payo of bidder 1 when she shades through β is therefore
Π(β) = E ((X1 −ψB (B))FZ (ψB (B))) .
Suppose that β 7→ βt = β + tρ, where t > 0 is small and ρ is a function. Let Bt = βt (X1). We
denote the corresponding virtual value function byψBt .
We have (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix) if we dierentiate with respect to t and hence take a
directional derivative for β in the direction of ρ, under mild conditions on β ,
∂
∂β
Π(β) = E
(
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0
[(X1 −ψB (B))fZ (ψB (B)) − FZ (ψB (B))]1[ψB (B)>0]
)
(4)
+
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0,ψB (B)=0
K∏
i=2
FVi (0)f1(x1,β )x1,β ,
where x1,β is such that b = β(x1,β ) and ψB (b) = 0. We note that fZ (t) = 0 and FZ (t) = 0 when
t < 0.
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In the work below, we naturally seek a shading function β such that these directional deriva-
tives are equal to 0. We will therefore be interested in particular in functions β such that [x −
ψB (β(x))]fZ (ψB (β(x))) = FZ (ψB (β(x))), whenψB (β(x)) > 0. e second term in our equation has
intuitively to do with the event where the other bidders are discarded for not beating their reserve
price. As we will see below, we can sometimes ignore this term, for instance when an equilibrium
strategy exists which amounts to canceling the reserve prices.
Let us rst present some intermediary results to get symmetric equilibrium result among others.
4.1.2 Key ODEs and consequences. As before, we call X1 a non-negative random variable rep-
resenting the distribution of values of bidder 1 with density f1. For simplicity in dening virtual
values we assume that f1 > 0 on the support1 of X1.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose B = γ (X1), where γ is increasing and dierentiable. If b = γ (x1), we have
ψB (b) = γ (x1) + γ ′(x1)[ψ1(x1) − x1] . (5)
Furthermore, if for some x0 and a function h we have
γh(x) =
γh(x0)(1 − F1(x0)) −
∫ x
x0
h(u)f1(u)du
1 − F1(x) ,
then
γh(x1) + γ ′h(x1)[ψ1(x1) − x1] = h(x1) . (6)
Interpretation. Informally, the previous result says that it would be very easy for bidder 1 to
shade her bid in such a way that the virtual value of her bid b, i.e. ψB (b), be any function h of her
value she chooses.
A simple consequence of Lemma 4.1 is the following result, which pertains directly to non-linear
shading strategies.
Lemma 4.2. Let h be an increasing function. Call (l, u) the support of X1. Assume that f1 > 0 on
(l, u). en, γ dened as
γ (x) =
∫ u
x h(t)f1(t)dt
1 − F1(x) = E (h(X1)|X1 ≥ x) (7)
is increasing and dierentiable on the support of X1.
In particular, if B = γ (X1), we have, for b = γ (x1),
ψB (b) = h(x1) ,∀x1 ∈ (l, u) .
e proof of these technical but not dicult lemmas are in the Appendix, Subsection A.2.
4.2 The case of symmetric bidders
Theorem 4.3. Consider an auction with K independent and symmetric bidders, having value
distribution represented by the random variable X .
In the Myerson auction, a symmetric equilibrium strategy for the bidders is to shade their bids by a
function βeq that satises
βeq(x) + β ′eq(x)(ψX (x) − x) = β I (x) ,
where β I (x) is their symmetric equilibrium rst price bid in a rst price auction with no reserve price.
1Taking care of the case where f1 can take the value 0 at a few points introduces articial technical problems that are not
particularly hard to solve but would obscure the ow of our argument.
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A solution of this equation is
βeq,M (x) = E
(
β I (X )|X ≥ x
)
, with
b1 = βeq,M (x1) = E
(
β I (X )|X ≥ x1
)
being the shaded bid of bidder 1 .
With this strategy, the bidders’ expected payos are the same as what they would get in a rst price
auction with no reserve price. In particular, it is strictly greater than their expected payos had they
bid truthfully.
Discussion. e intuition behind this result is quite clear. In the Myerson auction, the expected
payo of any given bidder is the same as that of a rst price auction where her bids have been
transformed through the use of her virtual value function. We call the corresponding pseudo-bids
virtualized bids. Hence, if the bidders can bid in such a way that their “virtualized” bids are equal
to their symmetric equilibrium rst price bids, the situation is completely equivalent to a rst price
auction. And hence their equilibrium strategy in virtualized bid space should be the strategy they
use in a standard rst price auction with no reserve price.
Our theorem shows that by adopting such a strategy symmetric bidders can avoid facing a
non-zero reserve price. Furthermore, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 show that it is easy for bidders to shade in
such a way that their virtualized bids are equal to any increasing function of their value they choose.
Also, this shading is specic to each bidder: the corresponding ordinary dierential equations do
not involve the other bidders. As such it is also quite easy to implement.
Nonetheless, the shading is quite counter-intuitive at rst, since bidders may end up bidding
higher than their value (for instance if their value is 0). eir payments are however made in terms
of virtualized bids, at least in expectation. And of course, in terms of virtualized bids, nothing is
counter-intuitive: everything has been done so that their virtualized bids are equal to their rst
price bids, which are less than their values.
Proof. We rst investigate properties of fZ and FZ in symmetric situations and then verify, as
is classical (see [Krishna, 2009], Chapter 2), that our proposed solution is indeed an equilibrium.
Suppose the bidders shade using the shading function β . Let us call h(x) = ψB (β(x)), when
Bi = β(Xi ). Note that all Bi ’s have the same distribution in symmetric equilibrium, which we call B.
In a symmetric equilibrium, everybody will use this shading. Recall that the key relation was
(x1 −ψB1 (β(x1)))fZ (ψB1 (β(x1))) − FZ (ψB1 (β(x1))) = 0 , forψB1 (β(x1)) > 0 .
• Preliminaries 1: Symmetric situation: property of FZ and fZ : IfW = h(X ), with h increasing,
FW (t) = P(W ≤ t) = P(h(X ) ≤ t) = P(X ≤ h−1(t)) = FX (h−1(t)) .
erefore,
FW (t) = FX (h−1(t)) , fW (t) = fX (h
−1(t))
h′(h−1(t)) ; FW (h(x)) = FX (x) , fW (h(x)) =
fX (x)
h′(x) .
If X2, . . . ,XK are independent and are using this strategy, we have for h(x) > 0,
FZ (h(x)) = FK−1X (x) and fZ (h(x)) = (K − 1)
fX (x)
h′(x) F
K−2
X (x) .
So the key relation
(x1 −ψB1 (β(x1)))fZ (ψB1 (β(x1))) − FZ (ψB1 (β(x1))) = 0 , forψB1 (β(x1)) > 0 .
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can now be re-wrien as
(x − h(x))(K − 1) fX (x)
h′(x) = FX (x) , or (K − 1)(x − h(x))fX (x) − h
′(x)FX (x) = 0 ,h(x) ≥ 0
• Preliminaries 2: Connection with rst price auctions
We recognize here the equation for h dening the shading strategy in a rst price auction with no
reserve price (see Krishna [2009], Chapter 2). We can also solve this equation in a very simple way.
Indeed, the most general solution of this dierential equation is just
h = h0F
−(K−1) with h′0(x) =
K − 1
x
fX (x)FK−2x .
Taking
h(x) =
∫ x
0 yд(y)dy
G(x) , where G(x) = F
K−1(x) , and д = G ′ ,
we nd a solution that is increasing, with h(x) > 0 for x > 0. Of course, h can be reinterpreted as
h(x) = E (Y1 |Y1 < x) = β I (x),
where Y1 is the maximum bid of bidder 1’s (K − 1) competitors in the auction. is of course is
nothing but a symmetric equilibrium rst price bid in the symmetric case with no reserve price,
see [Krishna, 2009], p. 15.
• Verication argument Equipped with the results we derived above, the last step of the proof
is just a verication argument. We note that β I (x) is an increasing function of x . Furthermore, if γ
is a solution of
γ (x) + γ ′(x)(ψX (x) − x) = β I (x) ,
such that
γ (x) =
∫ u
x β
I (t)f (t)dt
1 − F (x) = E
(
β I (X )|X ≥ x
)
,
we have seen in Lemma 4.2 that γ is increasing under our assumptions when h(x) = β I (x) is
increasing as is the case here. Also β I (x) > 0 for x > 0 and β I (x) = 0 if x = 0. (u is the right end
point of the support of X .)
We conclude that our function βeq,M = E
(
β I (X )|X ≥ x ) is increasing.
We need to verify that the problem we are dealing with is regular, so that the payo of the
Myerson auction is indeed what we announced and in particular, no ironing is necessary (see
Myerson [1981] or Toikka [2011]) . Almost by denition, we have, if b = βeq,M (x1),
ψB (b) = ψB (βeq,M (x1)) = β I (x1) = β I (β−1eq,M (b)) .
Since βeq,M is increasing, so is β−1eq,M ; and since β
I is increasing, so is β I ◦ β−1eq,M . We conclude that
ψB is increasing and so the design problem for the seller receiving B is regular.
Now as we are in the symmetric case, if our adversaries use this strategy, bidder 1’s opposition
in virtual value space is Z = max(0,ψBi (βeq,M (Xi ))) = max2≤i≤K (0, β I (Xi )) = max2≤i≤K (β I (Xi )).
For this last equality we have used the well-known and easy to verify fact that β I (Xi ) ≥ 0 with
probability 1. So the distribution of Z is continuous, it has no discontinuity at 0. In particular, for
the functional derivative of our payo we have, in the notation of Subsection 4.1
∂
∂β
Π(βeq,M ) = E
(
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0
[(X1 −ψB (B))fZ (ψB (B)) − FZ (ψB (B))]
)
.
Now we have done everything so that with b = βeq,M (x1) as above (and B = βeq,M (X1)))
[(x1 −ψB (βeq,M (x1)))fZ (ψB (βeq,M (x1))) − FZ (ψB (βeq,M (x1)))] = 0 for all x1 in the support of X1 .
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Of course the same reasoning applies to the other bidders. To nish the equilibrium proof, we
note that the expected payo of the bidder shading her bid as described above is the same as what
she would get in a rst price auction with no reserve price. Using the revenue equivalence principle
(see [Krishna, 2009], Chapter 3), this is also what she would get in a second price auction with
no reserve price. Of course, the standard Myerson auction where bidders are symmetric and bid
truthfully amounts to performing a second price auction with reserve price set at the monopoly
priceψ−1X (0). e expected payo of the bidders for this laer auction is clearly strictly less than
that in the second price auction with no reserve price. We conclude that the expected payo of
the symmetric bidders using the strategy described above is strictly greater than what they would
have goen had they bid truthfully. 
4.3 The case of one strategic bidder
e case of one strategic bidder is also of interest, and motivated by the dierent nature of the
various bidders involved in online advertising auctions. Recent work on boosted second price
auctions [Golrezaei et al., 2017] was in part motivated by the desire to account for this diversity,
between for instance what these authors call brand bidders and retargeting bidders, and also to
simplify the implementation of the Myerson auction. Recall that [Golrezaei et al., 2017] propose to
eectively linearize the virtual value of the bidders before applying a Myerson-type approach on
these “linearly-virtualized” bids.
In this context, distributions with exactly linear virtual value play a particular role. It is easy to
show that those distributions are Generalized Pareto (GP) distributions. We refer to [Balseiro et al.,
2015] and [Allouah and Besbes, 2017] for their use in the auction context and for pointing out their
remarkable simplicity in terms of virtual value computations.
When doing explicit computations or focusing on boosted second price auctions we will naturally
also make use of this family of distributions.
4.3.1 General formulation. e problem faced by bidder 1 in the Myerson auction has not
changed. She seeks to shade her bid through a mapping β , i.e. bid B = β(X1) so as to maximize
Π(β) = E ([X1 −ψB (B)]FZ (ψB (B))) .
Nonetheless, two aspects of the problem will now dier from our earlier work: on the one hand FZ ,
which represents the bid distributions she is facing is now “xed”, i.e. unaected by β , because
the other bidders are non-strategic; on the other hand, the shading function β will on occasion be
considered to be part of a parametric family. In this case, what was before a directional derivative
will then be a simple gradient.
With this in mind, and with a slight overloading of notations (since in the parametric case ∂/∂t
below is just a gradient), we recall the key relationship
∂
∂β
Π(β) = E
(
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0
[(X1 −ψB (B))fZ (ψB (B)) − FZ (ψB (B))]1[ψB (B)>0]
)
+
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0,ψB (B)=0
K∏
i=2
FVi (0)f1(x1,β )x1,β ,
where x1,β is such that b = β(x1,β ) andψB (b) = 0. We will be keenly interested in shading functions
β such that
(x1 −ψB (β(x1)))fZ (ψB (β(x1))) = FZ (ψB (β(x1))) , whenψB (β(x1)) > 0 .
Indeed, for those β ’s, the expectation in our dierential will be 0. Hence, computing the dierential
will be relatively simple and in particular will give us reasonable guesses for β and descent directions,
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even if it does not always give us directly an optimal shading strategy. Furthermore, when K is
large, the second term fades out, as the probability that no other bidder clear their reserve prices
becomes very small.
If we proceed formally, and call, for x > 0, h(x) = (Id + FZ /fZ )−1(x) (temporarily assuming
that this - possibly generalized - functional inverse can be made sense of), we see that solving the
previous equation amounts to solving
ψB (β(x1)) = (Id + FZ /fZ )−1(x1) = h(x1) .
Lemma 4.1 can of course be brought to bear on this problem. We note that we will be primarily
interested in solutions of this equation for x1’s such thatψB (β(x1)) > 0.
4.3.2 Explicit computations in the case of Generalized Pareto families. It is clear that now we need
to understand FZ , FZ /fZ and related quantities to make progress. By denition, if X is Generalized
Pareto (GP) with parameters (µ,σ , ξ ), we have, when ξ < 0 and t ∈ [µ, µ − σ/ξ ],
P(X ≥ t) = (1 + ξ (t − µ)/σ )−1/ξ
and otherwise P(X ≥ t) = exp(−(t − µ)/σ ) if ξ = 0. See Appendix B.1 for further details. In GP
families, the virtual value has the form ψ (t) = cψ (t − r ∗), where r ∗ is the monopoly price and
cψ = 1 − ξ .
Lemma 4.4. Suppose Y has a Generalized Pareto distribution. Call FY the cdf of Y and fY its density.
If V = ψY (Y ), whereψY is the virtual value of Y , we have FV (t) = FY (ψ−1Y (t)) and
FV (t)
fV (t) = cψ
FY (ψ−1Y (t))
fY (ψ−1Y (t))
,
where cψY = ψ
′
Y (t). If r ∗Y is the monopoly price associated with Y , we more specically have
ψ−1Y (t) =
t
cψY
+ r ∗Y , and
FV (t)
fV (t) = cψY
FY (t/cψY + r ∗Y )
fY (t/cψY + r ∗Y )
.
In case FY has nite support, we naturally restrict t to values such that x = ψ−1Y (t) is just that
fY (x) > 0.
Proof. FV is just the cumulative distribution function ofψY (Y ), whereψY is the virtual value of
Y . Hence, since in GP familiesψY is increasing,
FV (t) = P(V ≤ t) = P(ψY (Y ) ≤ t) = FY (ψ−1Y (t)) .
In particular,
fV (t) =
fY (ψ−1Y (t))
ψ ′Y (ψ−1Y (t))
.
In Generalized Pareto families,ψY is linear, so thatψ ′Y is a constant, becauseψY (t) = cψY (t − r ∗Y ),
where r ∗Y is the monopoly price. e rst result follows immediately. Noticing that ψ
−1
Y (x) =
x/cψY + r ∗Y gives the second result. 
e previous lemma yields the following useful corollary.
Corollary 4.5. Suppose K ≥ 2, Y2, . . . ,YK are independent, identically distributed, with General-
ized Pareto distribution. CallψY their virtual value function and Z = max2≤i≤K (0,ψY (Yi )). en, if
FZ is the cumulative distribution function of Z , we have
FZ (t)
fZ (t) =
cψY
K − 1
FY (t/cψY + r ∗Y )
fY (t/cψY + r ∗Y )
, for t > 0 and such that fY (t/cψY + r ∗Y ) > 0 .
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4.3.3 An example: uniform non-strategic bidders. In this subsection we assume that bidder 1
is facing K − 1 other bidders, with values Yi ’s that are i.i.d Uni f [0, 1]. In this case, cψY = 2 and
r ∗Y = 1/2 so FZ (t) = min(1, [(t + 1)/2]K−1) for t > 0. We recall that the Uni f [0, 1] distribution is
GP(0,1,-1). Bidder 1 is strategic whereas bidders 2 to K are not and bid truthfully.
Lemma 4.6 (Shading against (K − 1) uniform bidders). Suppose that X1 has a density that is
positive on its support. We assume for simplicity that X1 is bounded by (K + 1)/(K − 1). Let ϵ > 0 be
chosen by bidder 1 arbitrarily close to 0. Let us call
h(ϵ )K (x) =
{
K−1
K
ϵ
1+ϵ x if x ∈ [0, (1 + ϵ)/(K − 1)) ,
K−1
K
(
x − 1K−1
)
if x ≥ (1 + ϵ)/(K − 1) .
A near-optimal shading strategy is for bidder 1 to shade her value through
β (ϵ )1 (x1) = E
(
h(ϵ )K (X1)|X1 ≥ x1
)
.
As ϵ goes to 0+, this strategy approaches the optimum.
If the support of X1 is within (1/(K − 1), (K + 1)/(K − 1)), then ϵ can be taken equal to 0.
Proof. If we call h(x) = ψB (β(x)) we can in this case write bidder 1’s expected payo directly
using the results of the previous subsection:
Π(β) =
∫
x :h(x )>0
(x − h(x))min
(
1, [h(x) + 1]
K−1
2K−1
)
f1(x)dx .
In light of the fact we want to maximize this integral as a function of h, with the requirement that
h > 0, it is natural to study the function fx (c) = (x − c)[c + 1]K−1.
If we call hK (x) = argmaxc≥0 fx (c), we can split the problem into two cases. If x > 1/(K − 1),
hK (x) = K−1K
(
x − 1K−1
)
. Note that with our assumption that x ≤ (K + 1)/(K − 1), hK (x) ≤ 1. For
x < 1/(K − 1), the function fx (·) is decreasing for c ≥ 0. Hence,
hK (x) = argmaxc≥0(x − c)[c + 1]K−1 =
{
0 if x ≤ 1/(K − 1) ,
K−1
K
(
x − 1K−1
)
if x > 1/(K − 1) .
Recall that for Lemma 4.2 to apply, we need to integrate an increasing function and hK is not
increasing on (0,∞).
However, bidder 1 can use the following ϵ-approximation strategy: let us call
h(ϵ )K (x) =
{
K−1
K
ϵ
1+ϵ x if x ∈ [0, (1 + ϵ)/(K − 1)) ,
K−1
K
(
x − 1K−1
)
if x ≥ (1 + ϵ)/(K − 1) .
Notice that supx |h(ϵ )K (x)−hK (x)| < ϵ/K . In light of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the corresponding function
β (ϵ )1 (x1) = E
(
h(ϵ )K (X1)|X1 ≥ x1
)
is increasing and will then guarantee an expected payo that is nearly optimal since it will be
Π(β (ϵ )) = 1
2K−1
∫
(x − h(ϵ )K (x))[hϵ )K (x) + 1]K−1 f1(x)dx .
It can be made arbitrarily close to optimal by decreasing ϵ . Using ϵ > 0 guarantees that the
virtualized bid h(ϵ )K (x) is always strictly positive and hence eectively sends the monopoly price for
bidder 1 to 0. (Even if β (0) is increasing, a potential problem might occur if the virtualized bid is
exactly zero. Using β (ϵ ) with ϵ = 0+ solves that problem.)
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Fig. 3. Myerson auction: Bids and virtualized bids with one strategic bidder There are K=4 bidders,
only one of them is strategic. On the le hand side, we present a plot of the bids sent to the seller. “Linear
shading” corresponding to a bid βα (x) = αx , where x is the value of bidder 1; here α is chosen numerically to
maximize that buyer’s payo - see Lemma 3.1. “Optimal” corresponds to the strategy described in Lemma
4.6, with ϵ = 0+. On the right hand side (RHS), we present the virtualized bids, i.e. the value taken by the
associated virtual value functions evaluated at the bids sent to the seller. This corresponds on average to
what the buyer is paying in the Myerson auction, when those virtualized bids clear 0. We can interpret the
RHS figure as showing that for both optimal and linear shading, a strategic buyer end up winning more oen
and paying less (conditional on the fact that she won) than if she had been truthful; this explains why her
average payo is higher than with truthful bidding.
If X1 is supported on a subset of [1/(K − 1), (K + 1)/(K − 1)), taking ϵ = 0 is possible and
optimal. 
e assumption that X1 ≤ (K + 1)/(K − 1) can easily be dispensed of as the proof makes clear :
one simply needs to look for the argmax of another function. Our main example follows and does
not require taking care of this minor technical problem.
Case where bidder 1 has value distribution Unif[0, 1]. We rst note that X1 ≤ 1 ≤ (K +
1)/(K − 1), so Lemma 4.6 applies as-is. We therefore have
β (ϵ )1 (x) =
{K−1
K [ 12 (1 + x) − 1K−1 ] if 1 ≥ x ≥ xϵ = 1+ϵK−1 ,
K−1
K
1
1−x
(
ϵ
1+ϵ
1
2 (x2ϵ − x2) + β (ϵ )1 (xϵ )(1 − xϵ )
)
if x < 1+ϵK−1 .
Taking ϵ to 0 yields
β1(x) =
{
K−1
K [ 12 (1 + x) − 1K−1 ] if x ≥ 1K−1 ,
1
1−x
(K−2)2
2(K−1)K if x <
1
K−1 .
See Figure 3 for a plot of β1 and comparison to other possible shading strategies.
Similar computations can be carried out ifX1 has another GP distribution. For those distributions,
the shading beyond 1/(K−1) is also ane in the value of bidder 1, x1. (See Appendix B.2 for relevant
details.) Interestingly, it is easy to verify that ane transformations of GP random variables are GP.
However, if the support of X1 includes part of (0, 1/(K − 1)), β1(X1) will not have a GP distribution
in general.
4.3.4 Boosted second price auctions: shading through GP families . Motivated by boosted second
price auctions [Golrezaei et al., 2017], we study the question of shading one’s bid in a way that
guarantees that the distribution of bids sent to the seller is in the GP family. In this case, boosted
second price auctions turn into Myerson auctions.
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It seems natural that a strategic bidder facing a boosted second price auction would shade her
bid by sending bids with distribution in the Generalized Pareto family2 since this would facilitate
the computation of her expected payo and also limit the uncertainty appearing otherwise because
of the implementation of the linearization of her virtual value function (see [Golrezaei et al., 2017]
for description of that procedure) for non-GP random variables.
If bidder 1 has value X1, a random variable whose cumulative distribution function is F1, which
we assume to be a continuous function. enU1 = 1− F1(X1) has a uniform distribution. Let us call
p = (µ,σ , ξ ) , and
Xp =
σ
ξ
[
(1 − F1(X1))−ξ − 1
]
+ µ , xp =
σ
ξ
[
(1 − F1(x1))−ξ − 1
]
+ µ .
It is clear (see Appendix B.1) that Xp has GP(µ,σ , ξ ) distribution; furthermore xp is an increasing
function of x1. Bidder 1’s payo in a boosted second price auction is
Π(p) = E ((X1 −ψp(Xp))FZ (ψp(Xp))) and she seeks p∗ = argmaxp Π(p) .
is is a 3-parameter optimization problem. It is in general non-convex but numerical optimization
methods could nonetheless be used by a strategic bidder to increase her expected payo. See
Subsection B.3 for further details.
4.4 Beyond the Myerson auction and future work
e key element in geing the main results of Subsection 4.2 was a representation of the bidder’s
expected payo as a function of her value, the shading function she used, and the distribution of
the competition she faced in terms of virtual bids.
It seems possible to obtain such a representation for other types of auctions, such as certain
second price auctions with personalized reserve prices (see [Paes Leme et al., 2016]). e technique
we have used in Sections 3 and 4 is simply to “integrate out” the competition so as to be able to
formulate a functional optimization problem in terms of a single bidder. We leave the details of this
and related problems to future work.
Finally, another potentially more practical strategy would be to shade bids innitesimally and to
adjust this innitesimal shading to reactions of the other bidders and the seller. While connected to
the main theme of our paper, this approach raises a number of questions that are quite dierent in
nature from those that form the core of this work and we plan to present our work on innitesimal
shading in another piece of work.
5 CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper that revenue optimization on the seller side turns a number of
classical auction formats that are widely purported to be truthful into auctions that are not incentive
compatible. is is especially relevant in the context of repeated auctions and Internet advertising.
Bidders’ shading strategies can be as simple as linearly shading bids. is already results in
increased payos for them at both ends of the complexity spectrum for auctions, from certain
second price auctions to the Myerson auction. For this laer auction, we also nd that it is a
symmetric equilibrium for bidders to shade their bids in a non-linear way resulting in the same
expected payo for them as in a rst price auction with no reserve price. e tools we develop in
the paper also allow us to exhibit non-linear shading strategies when only one buyer is strategic
while the others bid truthfully.
2we discuss here only deterministic shadings into the GP families; stochastic shadings are of course possible by relying on
copulas. See [Nelsen, 2006] for a review of those tools.
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is suggests that, counter-intuitively, adopting revenue-optimizing auctions may not bring
more revenue to the seller. It does however turn otherwise simple means of exchange of goods into
quite opaque ones. Our work gives theoretical grounding to the o-heard practitioners’ call for
return to simple auctions, in particular in the world of online advertising auctions.
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APPENDIX
A DIRECTIONAL DERIVATIVES AND THE MYERSON AUCTION
A.1 Directional derivatives
Suppose β is an increasing and dierentiable function, X is a random variable with positive
density on its support and B = β(X ). We callψB the virtual value function of B. FZ is a cumulative
distribution function of the form FZ (x) = ∏Ki=2 FVi (x)1[x ≥0] , ΓK (x)1[x ≥0]. We assume that FVi ’s
are dierentiable (i.e. Vi ’s have a density) and therefore so is ΓK (x). We further assume that ΓK is
dierentiable and call its derivative γK (or fZ when its argument is positive).
We will also assume below that β is such thatψB is increasing; see Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 to see
how this requirement can be enforced.
We are interested in
Π(β) = E ((X −ψB (B))FZ (ψB (B)))
and its directional derivative.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that β has the properties mentioned above and is such thatψB is increasing.
Call xβ the point such thatψB (β(xβ )) = 0.
Let us call βt = β + tρ where ρ is another function dierentiable function. βt is also assumed to be
increasing and dierentiable, at least for t innitesimally small.
en, the directional derivative of Π(β) in the direction of ρ is
∂
∂β
Π(β) = E
(
∂
∂t
ψBt (Bt )

t=0
{[X −ψB (B)]fZ (ψB (B)) − FZ (ψB (B))} 1[ψB (B)>0]
)
+
∂
∂t
ψBt (bt )

t=0,B(b)=0
K∏
i=2
FVi (0)f (xβ )xβ
Proof. We call βt = β + tρ where ρ is another function. We assume that βt is also increasing
and dierentiable. Let us call bt = βt (x) and Bt = βt (X ). Note that using Equation (5), we have
ψBt (bt ) −ψB (b)
t
= ρ(x) + ρ ′(x)(ψX (x) − x) ,
Hence, as a function of β , ψB (b) admits a well dened directional derivative, which we call
∂
∂tψBt (bt )

t=0. Furthermore it is very easy to express in terms of ρ, ψX and x . To compute the
directional derivative of Π, we can therefore essentially dierentiate under the expectation sign.
We note that FZ is dierentiable in the sense of distributions and we have, if δ0 denotes a Dirac
point mass at 0,
F ′Z (x) =

γK (x) if x > 0 ,
δ0
∏K
i=2 FVi (0) if x = 0 ,
0 if x < 0 .
If we rewrite Π(β) as an integral we have
Π(β) =
∫
fX (x)(x −ψB (β(x)))FZ (ψB (β(x)))dx .
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Calling xβ the point such thatψB (β(xβ )) = 0, we have aer taking the directional derivative under
the integral
∂
∂β
Π(β) =
∫
∂
∂t
ψBt (bt (x))

t=0
fX (x) {[x −ψB (β(x))]γK (ψB (β(x))) − FZ (ψB (β(x))})dx
+
∂
∂t
ψBt (bt )

t=0,B(b)=0
K∏
i=2
FVi (0)f (xβ )xβ .
Reinterpreting the rst integral as an expectation concludes the proof. 
A.2 Proofs of ODE lemmas
We start by proving Lemma 4.1 and turn to Lemma 4.2 aerwards.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. If B = γ (X1), FB (x) = P(B ≤ x) = P(γ (X1) ≤ x) = F1(γ−1(x)), since γ is
increasing. Hence, for the density of B, we have
fB (x) = f1(γ−1(x)) 1
γ ′(γ−1(x)) .
erefore,
ψB (x) = x − 1 − FB (x)
fB (x) = x − γ
′(γ−1(x))1 − F1(γ
−1(x))
f1(γ−1(x))
= x + γ ′(γ−1(x)) [ψ1(γ−1(x)) − γ−1(x)] , and
ψB (b) = ψB (γ (x1)) = γ (x1) + γ ′(x1) [ψ1(x1) − x1] as b = γ (x1) .
is proves Equation (5). For the second part of the lemma, we recall thatψ1(x1) = (1−F1(x1))/f1(x1)
(see Krishna [2009], Chap. 5, p. 68). Hence, for any function η, we have, when f1(x1) > 0,
η(x1) + η′(x1) [ψ1(x1) − x1] = η(x1) − η′(x1)1 − F1(x1)
f1(x1) =
η(x1)f1(x1) + η′(x1)(F1(x1) − 1)
f1(x1)
=
(η(F1 − 1))′(x1)
f1(x1)
It is now easy to verify by direct computation that if
γh(x) =
γh(x0)(1 − F1(x0)) −
∫ x
x0
h(u)f1(u)du
1 − F1(x) , we have γh(x) − γ
′
h(x)
1 − F1(x)
f1(x) = h(x) .

We now turn to proving Lemma 4.2.
Proof of 4.2. In light of Lemma 4.1, the only question we have to sele is whetherγ is increasing
and dierentiable. If that is the case Equation (5) applies and then Equation (6) can be interpreted
as stating thatψB (b) = h(x1).
γ is clearly dierentiable and aer dierentiating it, it is clear that showing that γ is increasing
amounts to showing that for all x ∈ (l, u),∫ u
x h(t)f1(t)dt
1 − F1(x) = E (h(X1)|X1 ≥ x) > h(x) = inft ∈[x,u)h(t) .
e last equality is true because h is assumed to be increasing.
For the sake of completeness, we prove by elementary means this trivial inequality. Under our
assumptions on h, we can nd δ > 0 and x ≤ xδ < u such that if y ≥ xδ , h(y) ≥ h(x) + δ . (For
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instance, if u is nite, take xδ = (x + u)/2 and the corresponding δ . If u is innite, take xδ = 2x .)
Hence,
∫ u
x h(u)f1(u)du ≥ h(x)(F1(xδ )−F1(x))+(h(x)+δ )(1−F1(xδ )) = h(x)(1−F1(x))+δ (1−F1(xδ )).
Since F1(xδ ) < 1 because of the denition of xδ and f1 > 0, the result is shown.
is shows that γ is increasing and the Lemma is shown. 
B GENERALIZED PARETO DISTRIBUTIONS: REMINDERS AND DETAILS ABOUT
BOOSTED SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS
B.1 Reminders: definitions and basic results
If X is Generalized Pareto (GP) with parameters (µ,σ > 0, ξ ), we have, when ξ < 0,
P(X ≥ t) = (1 + ξ (t − µ)/σ )−1/ξ .
and otherwise P(X ≥ t) = exp(−(t − µ)/σ ) if ξ = 0. e support is [µ, µ − σ/ξ ].
2-parameter GP families are also oen considered; in this case µ = 0 and we denote the corre-
sponding random variable as GP(σ , ξ ). For the GP(σ , ξ ), we have the following simple results:
•
E (X ) = σ1 − ξ .
• e virtual value is
ψ (x) = (1 − ξ ) (x − E (X )) .
• In particular, the monopoly priceψ−1(0), which we denote by r ∗ is such that
r ∗ = E (X ) .
• We have the stochastic representation
X =
σ
ξ
(U −ξ − 1) , whereU ∼ Unif[0, 1] .
For GP(µ,σ , ξ ), the monopoly price is of the form r ∗ = σ/(1 − ξ ) − ξ µ/(1 − ξ ) and we have
ψ (x) = (1 − ξ )(x − r ∗) = (1 − ξ )(x − E (X )) − µ .
Of course, stochastically, if Xµ ∼ GP(µ,σ , ξ ) and X0 ∼ GP(σ , ξ ),
Xµ = µ + X0 .
B.2 An integral involving GP distributions
Suppose F1(x) = 1 − (1 + ξx/σ )−1/ξ , i.e. X is GP(σ , ξ ). For its density we have f1(x) = 1σ (1 +
ξx/σ )−1/ξ−1 on [0,−σ/ξ ]. A tedious computation shows that∫ −σ /ξ
x
u f1(u)du = σ
ξ
[
1
1 − ξ
(
1 + ξx
σ
)
− 1
]
(1 − F1(x)) .
e result is easy to verify by dierentiation.
e conclusion is that
r (x) =
∫ −σ /ξ
x u f1(u)du
1 − F1(x) = E (X |X ≥ x) =
x + σ
1 − ξ . (8)
Note that, as is obvious from the integral denition,
r (x) ≥ x ,
because
r (x) = x + σ1 − ξ = x +
σ
1 − ξ (1 + ξx/σ ) ≥ x , since x ≤ −
ξ
σ
.
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B.3 Boosted second price auctions: gradient computations
If bidder 1 has value X1, a random variable whose cumulative distribution function is F1, which
we assume to be a continuous function. enU1 = 1− F1(X1) has a uniform distribution. Let us call
p = (µ,σ , ξ ) , and
Xp =
σ
ξ
[
(1 − F1(X1))−ξ − 1
]
+ µ , xp =
σ
ξ
[
(1 − F1(x1))−ξ − 1
]
+ µ .
It is clear that Xp has GP(µ,σ , ξ ) distribution; furthermore xp is an increasing function of x1. Bidder
1’s payo in a boosted second price auction is, with the same notations we had above,
Π(p) = E ((X1 −ψp(Xp))FZ (ψp(Xp))) and she seeks p∗ = argmaxp Π(p) .
Here we focus on gradient computations for use in numerical optimization. If u1 = (1 − F1(x1)), it
is easy to verify that
ψp(xp) = (1 − ξ )xp − σ + ξ µ = 1 − ξ
ξ
σu
−ξ
1 −
σ
ξ
+ µ .
In particular,
∇pψp(xp) =

1
1−ξ
ξ u
−ξ
1 − 1ξ
σ
ξ 2 [1 − u
−ξ
1 + (1 − ξ ) ln(u−ξ1 )u−ξ1 ]
 .
It is also the case that whenψp(xp) = 0,u−ξ1 = (1−µξ/σ )/(1−ξ ). We conclude, using computations
similar to those leading to Equation (4) that
∇pΠ(p) = E
(
∇pψp(Xp)[(X1 −ψp(Xp))fZ (ψp(Xp)) − FZ (ψp(Xp))]1[ψp(Xp)>0]
)
+

1
− µσ
σ
ξ 2
{
ξ
1−ξ ( µσ − 1) + (1 − µξσ ) ln[u−ξ1 ]
}
K∏
i=2
FVi (0)f1(x1)x1 ,
where u1 = 1 − F1(x1) and u−ξ1 = (1 − µξ/σ )/(1 − ξ ). is result could be used to implement rst
order optimization methods for optimization in the seing of boosted second price auctions.
In case FZ is known, and as could be probably surmised in boosted second price auctions
corresponds to GP bids, Lemma 4.4 would prove useful. In particular, in this situation, a reasonable
rst approach would be to neglect the second term of the previous equation and nd p such that
(x1−ψp(xp))fZ (ψp(xp))−FZ (ψp(xp))]1[ψp(xp)>0] = 0. is of course amounts to solving a dierential
equation of the same kind we have solved several times in this paper and so we do not pursue this
avenue of research in detail in this paper.
